The Spider, the Bee, the Snail and the Camel: Legal Knowledge, Practise, Culture, Institutions and Power in a Changing World by Arthurs, Harry W.
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CLPE Research Paper 1/2005 
Vol. 01 No. 01 (2005) 
 
Harry Arthurs 
 
The Spider, The Bee, The Snail And The Camel 
Legal Knowledge, Practise, Culture, 
Institutions and Power in a Changing World 
 
Keywords: Legal Education, Globalization, Legal Theory. 
 
Author Contact: Prof. Harry Arthurs 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
4700 Keele St., Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada 
Email: harthurs@osgoode.yorku.ca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      / 
abstract=829944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii
 
iii
CLPE Research Paper 1/2005 
Vol. 01 No. 01 (2005) 
 
Harry Arthurs 
 
THE SPIDER, THE BEE, THE SNAIL AND THE CAMEL 
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, PRACTISE, CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS 
AND POWER IN A CHANGING WORLD 
Abstract: This keynote address, delivered on the occasion of the 
5th Canadian Graduate Law Students Conference, held in Toronto 
on May 6.7, 2005, addresses the challenges for legal theory, legal 
practice and education in a globalized environment. Legal 
education is described as deeply embedded in the changing 
political economy of legal scholarship and legal practice. With 
increased subjection of law schools to allegedly clearly definable 
market demands, strong winds blow through the law schools in 
North-America and elsewhere. From the LL.B./J.D. program 
through graduate studies, curricular reform becomes enmeshed in 
larger considerations of greater inter-school competition and 
greater compatibility to the outside world. In the midst of it, the 
aims of the law, its potential and its limits, move out of sight. 
 
Keywords: Legal Education, Globalization, Legal Theory. 
 
Author Contact: Prof. Harry Arthurs 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University 
4700 Keele St., Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada 
Email: harthurs@osgoode.yorku.ca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
THE SPIDER, THE BEE, THE SNAIL AND THE CAMEL 
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE, PRACTISE, CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS AND 
POWER IN A CHANGING WORLD 
Harry Arthurs 
Remarks to the Graduate Law Student Conference 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
May 6, 2005 
 
The people in this room represent the future of Canadian legal 
scholarship. I read admissions files, supervise graduate students, 
sit on dissertation committees, participate in oral examinations 
and evaluate graduate programs.  I know that legal scholarship has 
never been in better hands.   
In my title, I promised to introduce you to a number of strange 
legal creatures, starting with the spider. I’m a man of my word; in 
fact, I’m better than my word. I’m going to begin by introducing 
you not to one spider but to two. 
In the first sentence of his history of English law Frederick 
Maitland famously said that “the law is a seamless web” which he 
hesitated to disturb by plucking at one strand.  The metaphor is 
striking. It endows law with qualities of strength and adaptability. 
It assumes the continuity and coherence of law.  It suggests that 
law is produced by an all-powerful juridical spider which designs 
and executes the law with genius and tenacity, or in, in a more 
modern version, which merely extrudes it in the form of a 
naturally occurring social protein.  
The spider’s web metaphor reappears in the writings of Lon Fuller 
100 years later.  Fuller argued that many social problems are 
polycentric – like a spider’s web. Pull at one strand and you 
disturb another. Markets, for Fuller, were the quintessential 
polycentric problem.  Attempt to regulate one aspect of market 
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relations and you immediately trigger unexpected and unwanted 
consequences elsewhere. Fuller even offered a graduate seminar at 
Harvard on the state and economic life – a very irritating seminar, 
actually. It was built on the premise that it is essentially 
impossible to regulate market behaviour by law.  Fuller’s spider 
web, oddly, gets tangled up with Maitland’s in much of what 
emanates today from the World Bank, the law and economics 
movement and other neo-liberal propagandists for the rule of law.  
Law is the indispensable instrument of governance, they argue:  it 
is just and it is rational; it protects us from oppression by the state; 
it is the foundation of our freedom, security and prosperity.  But 
law, they say, should never be used to interfere with markets.   
Not to belabour the obvious, but these encounters with spiders 
remind us that judges, lawyers and legal scholars often disguise 
law’s ideological content by making legal institutions and 
outcomes seem natural, inevitable and immutable rather than the 
product of human agency and the expression of ideological belief 
and social choices.  
Next, the bee. The bee doesn’t appear by name in the famous case 
of Harrison v Carswell.  However, there is no other way of 
explaining the majority and minority judgments which were 
written by two of Canada’s finest judges.  The case involved the 
right of a striking employee to picket in the shopping centre where 
her employer was located.  The majority judgment of Mr Justice 
Dickson held that the landlord had a common law property right, 
enforceable under the Petty Trespass Act, to exclude the picket as 
a trespasser, and that only the legislature could take away that 
right.  Chief Justice Laskin, dissenting, argued that under certain 
circumstances, trespassers may enjoy a privilege which overrides 
the landowner’s right to control access.  As it happens, I studied 
property law with Laskin, and I remember the point precisely: if 
you are raising bees on your property, and they escape from the 
hive, you have a privilege to trespass on your neighbour’s property 
to recover them, so long as you are in hot pursuit.  
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Laskin himself was clearly in hot pursuit of a way to legalize 
picketing in shopping centres, a most worthy objective; and 
Dickson was hotly pursuing an equally worthy objective: 
defending democratically elected legislatures against judicial 
adventurism.  Alas, their good intentions and hot pursuits took 
these two fine judges madly off in opposite directions.  Law, it 
seems, can be expressed in the form of admirable and indisputable 
legal principles whose application produces totally contradictory 
results.  You choose your principle; you determine your outcome.  
Or more accurately, you decide on your outcome and then choose 
your principle.  Law, even for excellent lawyers, is result driven.  
And now the snail.  Everyone knows about the snail: its presence 
at the bottom of Mrs Donaghue’s ginger beer bottle prompted the 
House of Lords to articulate a principle of negligence law which 
allowed her to sue the manufacturer of the drink, rather than the 
shopkeeper who sold it to her friend.  Yes: everyone knows that 
snail. But thanks to some excellent legal historians, we now also 
know that Donaghue v Stevenson never went to trial; that there 
remains considerable doubt about whether the snail ever existed; 
and that it is by no means clear that Mrs Dohaghue was drinking 
ginger beer.  
Law, as it turns out, requires no empirical foundation to command 
obedience; it needs only to be rhetorically compelling, to appear to 
be just or sensible and to emanate from high authority.   
Finally, the camel.  William Twining - like Maitland, an historian 
and legal theorist - tells the story of how as a young law teacher in 
Khartoum, he introduced his students to an English tort case in 
which a child was bitten by a camel in the London Zoo. “Please 
sir,” a Sudanese student asked “What’s a camel doing in a zoo?”  
That question, says Twining, changed his understanding of law, 
and launched him on his famous theory of “law in context” – an 
important early contribution to socio-legal studies.   
Law, according to Twining, does have an empirical foundation 
after all.  It is a series of culturally contingent sub-systems which 
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are shaped by the specificities of time and place.  Law in context, 
then, really is a camel.  It is a bigger and more complex idea than 
the spider, the bee or the snail. It has two humps: it challenges 
both traditional views of law as decreed by God or nature, and 
contemporary attempts to describe law as a universal or global 
phenomenon. Like camels which apparently cannot reproduce 
without human assistance, Twining’s insight reminds us that law 
is a human artefact, as ubiquitous, various, perverse and sociable 
as humans themselves. And finally, once having pushed its way, 
camel-like, into the tent of legal consciousness, there’s no getting 
rid of this idea.  
So there you are: a brief history of legal thought over the past 
hundred and fifty years: from legal formalism, positivism and 
natural law to legal realism, functionalism, and pluralism.  I 
haven’t quite made it all the way to postmodernism, I admit. But 
since postmodernists hold that it is the reader who ultimately 
imparts meaning to the text, you are free at this point to nominate 
your own favourite animal.  
My objective, however, is not to leave you with a history or 
taxonomy of legal thought.  It is to show how these differing ideas 
about law shape what I might call the political economy of legal 
scholarship.   
Whether one thinks of law as a profession, as a university 
discipline, as a cultural phenomenon or as an institution of social 
control, at the centre of one’s understanding is a set of 
assumptions about legal knowledge.  Legal practice is different 
from accountancy or medicine because lawyers know things and 
do things that doctors and accountants don’t and can’t.  Law 
schools are different from philosophy or psychology departments 
because legal academics read different books, use a different 
vocabulary and employ different methodologies. Law is different 
from, say, the visual or performing arts because it conveys its 
symbolic and emotive messages through different conventions of 
dramaturgy. And law is different from the market or the church as 
a technique of social control because it employs different 
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strategies of persuasion and coercion. In each case, the assumption 
is that there is something distinctively “legal” which ultimately 
has to do with the nature of legal knowledge.   
However, I’m giving law the benefit of the doubt when I say that 
legal knowledge is different.  For reasons you can readily imagine, 
an excellent case can be made that law is a derivative discipline, 
that for the past 100 years or so it has been borrowing much of 
what it knows from other fields of study, that there isn’t much 
that is distinctively legal knowledge, and to the extent there is, it’s 
pretty suspect. Law’s distain for empirical facts and systemic 
analysis are but two of many examples. Put all of that off to one 
side.   
What I want to say is that even taking at face value the claim that 
there is a distinct and describable corpus of knowledge that we 
might label “law,” it is clear that law people disagree strongly 
amongst themselves over what that corpus might comprise.    
For practitioners, what they don’t need to know in their own 
practice might as well not exist. Stop any tax lawyer on Bay St.; 
ask her or him about criminal law or intellectual property, and 
chances are you will get a blank stare. Stop any lawyer in a small 
town and ask about securities law or constitutional law, and 
you’re pretty sure to get a look of incomprehension or worse. And 
being utterly frank, stop any law professor and ask about fields 
other than those she or he teaches and writes about, and you may 
well find equal puzzlement.  The only lawyers likely to profess 
omniscience are those you’ll find on the bench. Because our courts 
are courts of general jurisdiction, it’s understandable that they 
should claim to be able to transcend their professional specialties. 
However, after reading their judgments, one sometimes has to 
wonder whether a little more judicial modesty wouldn’t be 
appropriate.  
I want to say, next, that the internal division of knowledge 
amongst lawyers, both reflects and requires a division of legal 
labour. It also reflects and requires a division of wealth and power.  
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Legal labour is divided in several ways.  First, it is divided in terms 
of professional specialization, as I have already suggested. Tax 
lawyers and criminal lawyers, constitutional lawyers and 
securities lawyers obviously inhabit different universes of 
discourse – unless of course you believe, with Maitland, that the 
law is a seamless web.  It is also divided amongst those who 
litigate and those who advise, those who judge and those who 
produce legal knowledge.  But law is also socially stratified. At the 
top of the legal hierarchy are those who increasingly work in 
nation-wide and trans-national blue ribbon firms which serve a 
predominantly corporate clientele, and practice almost exclusively 
in areas of interest to these clients.  They are at the top not just 
because they associate most closely with the rich and powerful, 
enjoy the greatest financial and psychic rewards, and exercise the 
greatest influence in public affairs and the economy. They are also 
at the top because they get the chance to do the most complicated 
and interesting legal work, which brings them great professional 
recognition and esteem. At the bottom of the professional 
hierarchy are solo practitioners and lawyers in small firms who 
typically serve individual working class or middle class clients in 
local communities, earn relatively modest incomes performing 
what are often fairly routine tasks, and gain influence and prestige, 
if at all, only in their own community and amongst lawyers of 
their own kind.  Finally, the hierarchy within the profession to 
some extent reproduces social stratification in the wider society. 
The usual suspects – recent immigrants, women, and people of 
colour – have a difficult time penetrating the elite firms and tend 
to congregate elsewhere in the profession.   
So: who you are in the legal community, what you do in that 
community, to some extent determines what you know about law. 
That’s relatively easy and uncontroversial.  Now, however, I want 
to make a harder and more important argument.  So far I have 
been talking about different domains of legal knowledge – criminal 
law, taxation and so forth.  Now I want to argue that there are also 
profound differences in legal epistemology – in what we 
understand law to be.  This requires me to revisit the menagerie I 
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described at the beginning of my talk.  Spiders, bees, snails and 
camels have different understandings of the world they inhabit.  
It is difficult to say which animal represents legal practitioners.  
They don’t act like spiders, for sure. Lawyers who work with legal 
rules know that law is no seamless web; nor do they want it to be: 
they want to be able to pick and choose, to pluck and tear so that 
they can weave together the arguments they need to advance the 
interests of their clients, whatever the consequences for the 
coherence of the legal system. On the other hand, lawyers tend to 
talk as if they believed in the seamless web theory of law, and they 
often exhibit the same antipathy to state regulation that lay at the 
heart of Fuller’s spider metaphor.   
If not spiders, are practitioners snails? Almost certainly not: if 
practitioners were called on to demonstrate that legal rules have 
some basis in empirical reality, they would be in deep trouble. I’m 
about to publish an article in which I and my co-author argue that 
the Charter may well be a non-event.  As the empirical evidence 
shows, it hasn’t changed Canadian society very much, and it isn’t 
likely to do so.  If we’re right, this article ought to be deeply 
unsettling for Canada’s finest and most idealistic advocates.  But it 
won’t be.  They will dispute our evidence; they will challenge our 
logic; and they will make every effort to retain their world-view 
intact, to insist that the Charter has been a transformative event.  
My point is not that they are wrong and I am right; it is that they 
will not know how to engage – will not wish to engage - with the 
empirical evidence we are putting forward.   
Practitioners and judges come closer to being bees than anything 
else. As Harrison v Carswell reminds us, even the best of them is 
prepared to use any expedient argument, seize on any useful 
theory of the case, to make the result come out the way they think 
it ought to. And, paradoxically, I’m going to argue that 
practitioners are part-camel as well. Like Twining’s Sudanese 
student, they have an intuitive sense that law is context-specific.  
Contract principles which seem to govern employment contracts 
may not be very useful in the context of banking or property 
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transactions; which jurisdiction and whose court you get tried in 
is very important if you’re facing a criminal charge; the meaning of 
words in a statute depends on its history and purpose;  and how 
one resolves disputes in the entertainment industry may differ 
greatly from the way they’re resolved in construction.   
And what about us – “us” meaning legal intellectuals and 
academics?  We naturally have strong affinities with lawyers and 
judges. We speak the same language, though not necessarily the 
same dialect.  We share the same basic law school education, 
though ours is modified by subsequent graduate studies. We 
measure our successes, in part, by the extent to which we are able 
to convince lawyers and judges to look at legal issues in a 
particular way.  So in some ways, we have a recognizable 
connection to the creatures that can be found in any courtroom or 
law office. But in other ways, we are as different from most 
practitioners and judges as Darwin’s birds and turtles out there on 
the Galapigos are from their distant relatives in Patagonia or Pago 
Pago.  
In part, the differences can be seen as an extension of the division 
of labour which exists in professional practice. We also have our 
specialties though we tend to view them more reflectively and 
critically than most practitioners.  In part, too, scholars can be 
seen as a social stratum within the profession, somewhere 
between solo practitioners and members of large law firms.  Our 
incomes are comparable to those of the lower orders of the bar, 
though our perqs and benefits are probably better. On the other 
hand, we resemble members of prestigious law firms in several 
respects: we generally did pretty well at law school; we do 
important and worthy work; we enjoy a reasonably high profile 
both within the profession and in the public domain.  But unlike 
members of these law firms, we choose to lead our lives in less 
privileged precincts.   
In part, this says something about our temperament and values, 
about how we prefer to work, with whom and for whom, and on 
what. However, what mostly sets us apart from practitioners is 
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our epistemology.  Most practitioners look at law from the inside 
out. That is, they take legal rules and institutions and practices 
pretty much as a given, and then try to work with them.  Legal 
intellectuals, on the other hand, generally treat law as a subject of 
enquiry; they look at it from the outside in and try to understand 
not only what it is and how it works, but what are its social causes 
and consequences.  This arm’s length relationship from law 
testifies to the extent to which we have detached ourselves from 
Maitland’s view, which for most legal intellectuals has long since 
ceased to be a credible account of the nature of law. Instead we 
have committed ourselves to the kind of broad philosophical, 
social and cultural enquiry which enables us not only to go off in 
hot pursuit of Laskin’s bees, but also to expose the absence of 
Donaghue’s snail and meditate on the significance of Twining’s 
camel.  
I’m not saying that legal academics have ceased to do traditional 
legal analytical work, or that they should cease.  Indeed, in areas 
such as tax law and constitutional law, they do analytical work of 
great elegance and distinction.  Rather, I’m saying that if legal 
analysis is all they do, it’s not enough. All their hypotheses would 
be dubious, all their arguments incomplete, all their conclusions 
suspect, because they will have failed to make use of the full range 
of intellectual tools available to them.   
Those useful tools, of course, are not distinctively “legal” and they 
are not really ours.  We borrow them, sometimes shamelessly, 
from our neighbours in economics, literary theory, sociology or 
political science.  And to be honest, they are often tools which 
have been subject to a good deal of axe-grinding by liberals and 
neo-liberals, by feminists and critical race theorists. In other 
words, the people who design, use and sharpen them often have an 
ideological agenda as well as an intellectual one – as who does not?  
The result is that innovation and critique in law are largely 
derived from other disciplines, whether this is explicitly 
acknowledged or not.  
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This is a point worth dwelling on for a moment.  
Interdisciplinarity may be essential for serious scholarly work in 
law; but few of us who do that kind of work are properly qualified 
for it.  And how could we be?  I wrote a book on legal history 
without knowing the first thing about historiography.  I’ve done 
surveys and interviews without studying sociology and I’ve taught 
a course in political science with nothing more to go on than the 
courses I took as an undergraduate. I’m not boasting; I’m 
embarrassed. And so should we all be, because our commitment to 
interdisciplinary scholarship almost inevitably exceeds our 
competence.  Of course, no one person could be possibly be 
knowledgeable in the dozen or so disciplines necessary to function 
as well-informed legal intellectuals.  That’s why I think that 
graduate programs in law ought to set themselves two modest 
goals: (1) to ensure that future legal scholars demonstrate basic 
fluency in at least one of the social sciences, and (2) to ensure that 
they acquire skills and attitudes which will help them to work in 
partnership with colleagues in other disciplines.    
Now let me move on to the next stage of my argument.  On the 
one hand, we have the practising bench and bar: still spiders at 
some level - true believers in the coherence of law, even though 
they ought to know better - and still bees – opportunists who will 
use any argument that works. On the other hand, we have legal 
intellectuals who may not actually themselves search for snails or 
herd camels, but are nonetheless committed to the crucial 
importance of such activities. These two groups clearly create, 
possess, dispense and are defined by, different kinds of knowledge.  
The one locates itself at the core of the legal community, the other 
at its periphery.  They have different “relevant others,” different 
lifestyles, different values, different hierarchies and different 
rituals and rewards. And not least, they espouse different 
ideologies, with different degrees of explicitness and self-
consciousness.    
These differences manifest themselves in debates over the content 
of the law school curriculum, over bar admission and continuing 
education programs, over what judges ought to read and how 
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litigants ought to make arguments, over the extent of self-
congratulation or self-flagellation that is appropriate for the bar’s 
public utterances, over the propriety of appointing law professors 
to the bench and practitioners to law faculties, over the kind of 
evidence needed to assess the working of legal institutions or to 
justify law reform initiatives – and most of all, over what law is 
and what it does.   
These debates amount to something like a culture war amongst 
people who embrace competing visions of law and legal 
knowledge. But not just a culture war. To the extent that these 
competing visions have a significant ideological content, this is a 
political struggle as well.  Law and economics, feminist theory, 
critical legal studies, liberal legalism: these embrace radically 
divergent visions of the public good, of democratic process, of the 
role of the state, of the very terrain of politics.  And the war isn’t 
just cultural and political: it is economic too. Remember: legal 
intellectuals and legal practitioners earn their livelihoods and their 
reputations by preaching and practising their respective versions of 
legal knowledge.  Radical changes in legal practice or legal 
education enhance or diminish the value of their intellectual 
capital and the returns that capital earns them.   
Culture, politics, economics: these are words we use when we talk 
about power. But power doesn’t exist in a vacuum, at least not a 
vacuum called “law.”  Law isn’t sealed off from the broad political 
economy; it is part of it. It is therefore profoundly influenced by 
globalization and neo-liberalism – forces which are transforming 
virtually all power relations, including those based on legal 
knowledge.   
Globalization has changed the world of legal academe enormously. 
It looms large as a topic of scholarly writing; it has carved out a 
niche in law school curricula and syllabi; it has inspired some 
fairly radical experiments with trans-national and trans-systemic 
law degrees; it has bought law professors tickets to conferences all 
‘round the world. As you can imagine, all of this represents a 
major change in our consciousness and imagination, in the range 
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of sources scholars must read and the people they talk to. More 
important yet, globalization forces us to revisit long-standing 
assumptions about how to regulate economic and social 
behaviour.  Statutes passed by national legislatures don’t take us 
very far when it comes to regulating global markets for money, 
natural resources, intellectual property or labour.  But so far there 
is no global political process, no global legislature, no global 
regulatory regimes.  The result is that much market based activity 
effectively escapes regulation.  Dissatisfaction with this situation 
has led, in turn, to the invention of new non-state mechanisms of 
regulation which are of great interest to legal scholars – or at least 
to those who take an expansive view of law.    
Finally, at the level of legal theory, globalization pits Maitland 
against Twining, spider people against camel people.  Spider 
people claim that, in a global age, law too must be global, and that 
pending some means for making it so, domestic law must be built 
upon a platform of universally accepted legal norms including 
human rights, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, respect for 
property and free markets. Camel people, on the other hand, do 
not see domestic law as global law waiting to happen.  In fact, they 
emphasize the power and persistence of local politics, local 
culture, local societies and local law.  
These few examples will explain why I think that globalization 
has generally enlivened legal scholarship. But of course we have 
paid a price.  For Canada, globalization means integration into the 
American economy.  Whether they approve or oppose integration, 
Canadian scholars therefore find themselves at risk of being 
absorbed into debates framed up by American ideology, public 
policy, law and legal-academic culture.  In some other academic 
disciplines – economics for example – similar developments have 
greatly diminished the attention paid by scholars to Canadian 
issues. I hope law will not go the same way; but it certainly could.  
However, the direct effects of globalization on the legal scholarly 
community are as nothing compared to its impact on the 
Canadian bar.  By transforming the Canadian economy, 
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globalization has shrunk the domestic market for high-end legal 
services, harmonized away some of the distinctive elements of 
Canadian law thereby making irrelevant much of what Canadian 
lawyers know, lured many of our best and brightest young lawyers 
to practice opportunities offshore and – though it’s too soon to tell 
- possibly launched a process which will end up with Canada’s 
major leading law firms reincarnated as branch plants of foreign 
based global law firms.  This is likely to have a profound impact 
on our legal institutions and processes, on what our students 
expect to be taught, and how legal scholars define their agendas.   
The progress of globalization has proceeded in tandem with – has 
been a key factor in - the rise of neo liberalism. Over the past ten 
or twenty years, the Canadian state has retreated considerably 
from the role it played in social and economic life from, say, the 
1940s to the 1960s or 1970s.  This retreat has had important 
consequences for legal scholars, students and practitioners.   For 
one thing, there’s less money: less to support legal research, less to 
subsidize the costs of legal education, less to pay for academic 
“frills,” less to pay for legal aid plans and public sector law jobs.  
For another, there’s less regulatory activity by the state. Land use 
and environmental law, labour law, human rights and securities 
regulation have all dwindled in importance as sources of legal 
work and of academic inspiration.  True, some of the slack has 
been taken up by the Charter which has become a leading field of 
academic research and appellate litigation.  But overall, the 
reduction of the state’s role in the economy has been paralleled by 
a reduction in the presence of regulatory issues on academic 
bookshelves and on lawyers’ Blackberries and Daytimers.  
By far the most important effect of the rise of neo-liberalism, is 
that we seem to be launched on a long-term transition from an 
“old normal” to a “new normal.” For people of my generation, and 
those born through to the end of the 1960s, the “old normal” 
meant that the state would provide and the state would protect.  If 
the state didn’t do that, the state was in default of its obligations 
to its citizens.  Allowing for disagreements over degrees and 
modalities of state intervention, it is still broadly true to say that 
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most legal scholars during that period had been brought up to 
expect and applaud the activist state. Well, those people begat 
disciples and their disciples begat more disciples.  However, at 
some point – just about now - the blood lines begin to run thin.  
More recent generations of students will have grown up in an era 
when state activism is regarded as exceptional and presumptively 
undesirable.  They are likely to react very differently than I did to 
the notion that people need jobs or pensions or protection against 
the economic power of large corporations. “Let the market 
provide” tomorrow’s legal scholars are likely to say, “or fix it with 
the Charter;” but not “let’s invoke the regulatory and 
redistributive apparatus of the state.”   
In short, because of globalization and neo liberalism, many of the 
deep structures and hidden assumptions of postwar legal 
scholarship are coming under increasing stress as the old normal is 
slowly being displaced by the new normal. The result will be, I 
predict, increasing dissonance between the old progressive 
scholarship of the postwar period and the new neo-liberal 
paradigm of the state and legal system; this in turn will cause great 
intergenerational stress in the legal-intellectual community.   
You - the people in this room, the next generation of legal scholars 
and intellectuals – are going to find yourselves right in the middle 
of all that dissonance and all that stress. In fact, you and your 
contemporaries will be the cause of it.  But fear not: as someone 
who generated a good deal of dissonance and stress in his time, I 
promise you that being involved in these fundamental, paradigm-
shattering debates will be the making of you.  Spiders, snails, bees, 
camels: name your animal.  You and your colleagues will have the 
opportunity - you will have the responsibility - of redefining the 
very nature of law and of legal knowledge.   
What a challenge.  I wish I were on the other side of this lectern, 
starting all over again!  
 
